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Abstract 
 
A source of anxiety of policy makers and the public in general is the detrimental impact 
of globalization and immigration on unemployment. The transitory restrictions for 
worker migration after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 exemplify the supposed 
negative effect of immigration on labor markets. This paper aims to identify the effects 
of immigration alongside trade on unemployment taking into account the substitutabil-
ity of worker and goods flows. We use data from 24 OECD countries over the period 
from 1997 to 2007 and employ instrumental variables fixed effects and dynamic panel 
estimators in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity as well as the potential 
endogeneity of migration flows and the high persistence of unemployment. We find a 
significant negative effect of immigration on unemployment on average. 
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Does immigration lead to higher unemployment rates in the destination country?
This question is of eminent political importance as its answer, or at least what
policy makers perceive as its correct answer, has direct consequences for millions
of potential migrants across the globe. For example, as a reaction to rising unem-
ployment rates in the wake of the nancial crisis, several countries implemented
voluntary return programs (VRPs) for migrants with entitlements to domestic
unemployment benet schemes. These programs oered nancial incentives like
a free one way return ticket as well as lump sum payments if immigrants left the
host country and did not return for at least three years. Even though few of the
migrants eligible for the programs did actually participate, according to Manzano
and Vaccaro (2009), the Spanish government spent e21 million in 2009 on this
kind of program.1
At the European level, in the vein of the last two enlargements of the European
Union, both treaties of accession2 contained clauses about a transition period
before workers from the new member states could be employed on equal, non-
discriminatory terms in the old member states as policy makers feared negative
eects on labor markets in the EU-15 countries. The old member states had the
possibility to impose restrictions for worker immigration for a transitional period
of two years. Afterwards, they could decide to extend it for another three years.
After ve years, if the country informed the European Commission of serious
disruptions on its labor market the period could be extended for the last time
for two more years.3 Austria and Germany were the only member states which
used up the whole seven year period for shutting o their labor markets from
inows from eight of the ten accession countries from 2004 (from all but Malta
and Cyprus). This seven year period ended on May 1st, 2011.
How did Austria and Germany actually evaluate the serious disruption on
their labor markets? Basically, two arguments where brought forward defend-
ing transitional immigration restrictions. First, Germany's State Secretary for
Employment Gerd Andres defended Germany's decision to maintain restrictions
by pointing out that the disruptive eects of transition periods are not taken
into account. Second, he argued that \the geographical position is very dierent
for Germany and Austria than it is for France or the UK".4 EU-Employment
1Besides Spain also the Czech Republic and Japan have introduced VRPs. For further
details see Fix et al. (2009).
2The \Treaty of Accession 2003" was the agreement between the European Union and
ten countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Slovenia, Slovakia), concerning these countries' accession into the EU that took place 2004.
The \Treaty of Accession 2005" is an agreement between the European Union and Bulgaria
and Romania concerning accession into the EU of the latter two countries that took place 2007.
3See for more details http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=466&langId=en.
4http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/free-movement-labour-eu-27/article-
129648?display=normal.
1Commissioner Vladimir  Spidla accepted the application for prolongation of the
restrictions from both Austria and Germany by arguing that both countries \are
undergoing serious disturbance of their labour markets as a consequence of the
general economic downturn."5 In essence, the reports to the European Com-
mission only argued for the supposedly existing disruptive consequences of what
was perceived as a premature opening of labor markets. However, to the best of
our knowledge, no evidence was provided which would back up the causal link
between higher immigration and unemployment or any other detrimental labor
market eects. The causality, it seems, was taken for granted.6
This example illustrates the widely held belief that on average, immigration
has detrimental eects on the labor market in the destination country.7 This is in
contrast with current empirical evaluations of the eects of migration on wages of
domestic workers in the destination country. These studies can be grouped into
three types. The rst uses the elementary model of labor demand and carries out
simulations in order to quantify the eects (see for example Borjas (1999)). The
second approach uses natural experiments, i.e. supposedly exogenous inows of
migrants, like a short episode of easier Cuban immigration to Miami (Mariel boat
lift study by Card (1990)) or the immigration to France in the wake of the Al-
gerian independence (Hunt (1992)). The third approach employs ordinary least
squares methods to estimate parameters of a regression of (changes) in wages
or employment on the number of migrants and a set of control variables (Bor-
jas, Freeman, and Katz (1997), Borjas (1999), and Friedberg and Hunt (1995)).
All three approaches nd very modest eects of immigration on workers in the
destination country. More pointedly, the Czech government opposed the prolon-
gation of immigration restrictions in Germany and Austria as these were against
\available evidence".8
All these empirical studies of the eects of immigration were done by labor
economists. To the contrary, analysis of the process of European integration,
or more broadly globalization in general, is typically in the domain of trade
economists. While trade economists paid only scant attention to labor market
frictions for a long time, the eects of globalization on unemployment featured
more prominently in recent trade models. This recent literature focuses on mod-
els with heterogeneous rms and increasing returns to scale (Egger and Kre-
ickemeier (2009, 2011), Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011a), Helpman and
Itskhoki (2010), Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009, 2010a, 2010b)). One of
the main ndings in this literature is that trade liberalization is likely to reduce
5From http://www.europolitics.info/spidla-accepts-german-and-austrian-labour-market-
move-artr239442-25.html.
6See European Commission (2006).
7For empirical evidence on beliefs about the labor market consequences of immigration in
EU countries using European Social Survey data see Dustmann and Preston (2004).
8See http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/free-movement-labour-eu-27/article-
129648?display=normal.
2unemployment rates in both countries.
This literature also spurred new empirical investigations into the trade and
unemployment nexus. Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) as well as Felbermayr,
Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) investigate empirically the trade and unemployment
nexus using high-quality OECD cross-section and panel data. They both nd
support for a negative relationship between openness and unemployment levels.
However, they do not nd support for the predictions of comparative advantage
motives in the determination of unemployment rates.
While both papers use a battery of labor-market related control variables in
their regressions, none considers the eects of (im)migration. This is astonishing
as it is well known since Mundell (1957) that \[c]ommodity movements are at
least to some extent a substitute for factor movement". In a standard two goods,
two factors trade model without trade costs, factor prices will equalize through
goods trade. Hence, goods trade has the same eect as if factors could wander
freely between countries. In other words, immigration has the same impact on
factor prices as trade. When factor prices cannot fully adjust, there will be ad-
ditional eects on the quantity of labor used, i.e. the unemployment rate. Why
then should goods trade have a statistically signicant eect on unemployment
and (im)migration not matter at all? And when trade decreases unemployment,
should not (im)migration, too? If the answer to this question is yes, one has
to conclude that previous studies may suer from a potential omitted variable
bias. We want to contribute to both the trade and immigration literature and
address this bias by considering not only the eects of goods trade ows on un-
employment, but also of migration ows. In order to do so, we have to deal
with the problem that migrants do not select their destination countries ran-
domly. Rather, it is likely that they migrate into countries with better economic
conditions, including countries with lower unemployment rates. This creates an
endogeneity problem. We deal with it by using dynamic panel regressions as well
as a Frankel and Romer (1999) type instrument.
Finally, note that we are deliberately silent on compositional eects in our
empirical analysis, i.e. we do not distinguish between the impact of immigrants
of dierent skill groups on unemployment. We focus on aggregate migration
ows as we directly want to address the concern of policy makers and the pub-
lic at large which presupposes a positive impact of immigration on the level of
the unemployment rate on average. Accordingly, the transition periods of the
EU accession treaties also presuppose on average a positive impact and do not
distinguish between workers of dierent skill levels. By this we oer an alterna-
tive empirical strategy which complements the more micro-level based empirical
studies typically undertaken by labor economists.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the
theoretical background. Section 3 describes the database and gives suggestive
evidence. Section 4 describes the empirical specication. Section 5 provides the
empirical results. The last section concludes.
32 Theoretical background
What are the eects of trade and migration on unemployment? This section
discusses various theories and their implications of trade and migration for un-
employment. We will form hypotheses which can then be compared with our
empirical results.9
The starting point in the labor market literature to analyze the impact of
migration is usually the elementary model of labor demand (see, for example,
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), pages 605). In this framework immigration leads
to an overall welfare gain of workers in the destination country if workers are
owners of capital. The reason is that due to the migration inow, capital rents
increase even though wages fall. This is also called the \immigration surplus".
If one distinguishes between skilled and unskilled labor, the aggregate eects on
wages may be ambiguous. It basically depends on the substitutability of native
and foreign workers and on the substitutability of workers and capital. This
simple model, however, is silent about the employment eects.
Introducing wage rigidities in the labor demand model, for example due to
binding minimum wages or semi-rigid wages due to collective bargaining, leads
to a decrease of wages but to a lesser extent as with perfect labor markets and
to an increase of unemployment among native workers. The overall welfare gains
in the economy are ambiguous, depending on the magnitudes of the gain of rms
(capital owners) and the welfare loss of native workers. However, any gains will
be lower than in the competitive labor market case (see Boeri and van Ours
(2008), pp. 178).
Hypothesis 1: In the labor demand model with wage rigidities, immigration
will increase unemployment among native workers.
The question was also tackled from an international trade perspective. La-
yard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Nickell (1997), Nickell and Layard (1999),
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), and Ebell and Haefke (2009) provide evidence
that product market regulation in general leads to an increase in unemployment.
As trade barriers can be seen as a specic form of product market regulation, they
should also foster unemployment. Recently, Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) as
well as Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) provide evidence that more open
economies have lower unemployment rates on average.
One of the rst studies that investigated unemployment eects in a trade
model was Brecher (1974). He introduced minimum wages in a two sectors, two
factors, two countries Heckscher-Ohlin model (Davis (1998) provided a general-
ization of this model). In this framework, trade leads to factor price equalization
as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, in this framework trade
9There are many good surveys about international migration. Gaston and Nelson (2011)
is a particular useful one in the context of this paper as it surveys current theoretical and
empirical research on international migration with a particular emphasis on the links between
trade theory and labor empirics.
4leads to job losses in the capital-abundant country with binding minimum wages,
while the labor-abundant country with perfect labor markets benets from higher
wages without the incidence of unemployment. These results suggest a negative
correlation between openness of a country and its unemployment rate. This also
holds in models with search frictions and wage bargaining, such as Davidson,
Martin, and Matusz (1988, 1999).
Hypothesis 2: More open, capital-abundant countries have higher unem-
ployment rates.
Brecher and Chen (2010) analyze in a Heckscher-Ohlin model with eciency{
wages  a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) how trade, migration and outsourcing aect
unemployment. Concerning the eects of migration, they nd dierential eects
for skilled and unskilled workers for the case where trade is caused by an inter-
national dierence in unemployment benets for unskilled labor and where trade
is caused by an international dierence in technology. However, these dieren-
tial eects in those two scenarios both lead to the same conclusion for aggregate
unemployment: The eects on aggregate unemployment are ambiguous.
Hypothesis 3: In a Heckscher-Ohlin model with unemployment migration
has an ambiguous eect on aggregate unemployment for both skilled and unskilled
workers.
Besides the analyses of trade and unemployment within traditional neoclassi-
cal trade models, more recent attempts integrate trade models based on rm-level
increasing returns to scale and product dierentiation (Krugman (1979, 1980))
and the generalization to heterogeneous rms (Melitz (2003)) with labor mar-
ket frictions. Labor market frictions may arise due to fair wages or eciency
wages (Amiti and Davis (2011), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009, 2011)), minimum
wages (Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2011)) or due to search and matching fric-
tions (Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011a), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010),
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010a,2010b)).
Models of this vein focusing on one sector lead to a negative relationship
between unemployment rates and openness. The reason is that opening up to
trade leads to an increase of average productivity of existing rms due to a
selection of the most productive rms. This increase of average productivity
leads to lower average prices and lower vacancy posting costs. This induces rms
to increase vacancy posting which reduces unemployment.
Hypothesis 4: In a new trade theory model with labor market frictions, more
open countries have lower unemployment rates.
Allowing for migration in new trade theory models leads to so-called \new-
economic-geography" models (see the seminal paper by Krugman (1991) and the
monograph from Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999)). These models assume
perfect labor markets and highlight the importance of the initial distribution of
labor for the equilibrium distribution of economic activity between regions or
countries.
Extensions of this basic model by Epifani and Gancia (2005) and S udekum
5(2005) to allow for unemployment show that the industrialized (core) countries
will have lower unemployment rates than the developing (periphery) countries.
Migration from the periphery to the core countries will aggravate these unem-
ployment disparities in the long-run.
Hypothesis 5: In a new trade theory model with labor market frictions,
migration from the periphery countries to the core countries will aggravate unem-
ployment disparities, i.e. unemployment rates will fall (rise) in the inow (out-
ow) country.
Hence, summing up, whether immigration increases or decreases unemploy-
ment in the destination country is theoretically ambiguous. We therefore take a
look into the data in order to investigate the question empirically.
3 Data
To examine the relationship between migration, trade and unemployment we col-
lected a panel dataset from 1997 to 2007 for 24 OECD countries.10 The countries
included as well as the time period is driven by concerns of data availability.
In addition, we try to follow Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) and use
the same control variables in order to replicate their results on the trade and
openness link for our dataset. The dataset has the advantage that it allows to
control for time-invariant country-specic eects and the dynamics (persistence)
of unemployment rates. The variables used are summarized in Table 1. We will
describe each variable in turn in the following.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
3.1 Unemployment rates and immigration
The dependent variable is the harmonized unemployment rate (as percentage
of the civilian labor force) from the OECD (2011d) Key Short-Term Economic
Indicators, the same data as used in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b).
This data has the advantage that it is available for the whole time period under
consideration and for all OECD member countries. In addition, the OECD has
ensured that unemployment rates are comparable across countries.
The migration data are from the OECD (2011b) International Migration
Database. It contains bilateral data both on ows and stocks of immigrants.
10The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United
States.
6Note that the data do not contain information on illegal migration. Even though
data for some countries are available before 1997, broad coverage only starts then
and we therefore opt to start our analysis with this year. Specically, it contains
data on the inows and outows of immigrants from country i to j dening a
migrant as someone with a dierent nationality than the receiving country. From
these data we construct total inows of immigrants by collapsing the bilateral
data. Note that outows do only include foreigners, i.e. return migrants. It does
not include nationals leaving their home country. Hence net inows are inows
of foreign nationals.11 In addition, the data contains data on the total stock of
immigrants, using either an immigrant denition based on the nationality of the
person or its country of birth. Note that stock data are not available for all
countries as national governments dier in their used denitions of migrants and
hence do not necessarily collect data using both denitions.12
Figure 1 provides a rst look on the unemployment migration nexus. It plots
the average unemployment rate over the period of 1997 to 2007 against the aver-
age logged immigration net inows over the period of 1997 to 2007. As we see, this
gure suggests a positive relationship between immigration and unemployment.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
This correlation between unemployment and migration may be misleading
due to two main eects: i) It is an unconditional correlation, ignoring potential
heterogeneity of countries and other driving factors, and ii) the endogeneity of
migration ows and unemployment.
Concerning migration from the perspective of an individual, two questions
arise: The rst question is whether to migrate at all, and the second question,
given that one decided to migrate, where to migrate. The labor literature typi-
cally models those two decisions sequentially, where the second step depends on
11Countries with ow data used in the regressions are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and United States. Outows are not available (for a subset of years) for
Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey. For these cases,
we treat total inows as net inows, in eect overstating the number of migrants entering the
country. Our main results are robust to this treatment.
12Stock data based on nationality are available (for at least a subset of years) for Austria, Bel-
gium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom; stock data based on country of birth are available (for at least a subset
of years) for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ire-
land, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and United States.
7expected wage dierences between the origin and destination country, accounting
for unemployment dierences (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) and Boeri and
van Ours (2008) for an overview). In other words, immigration will be larger all
else equal into countries with lower unemployment rates. This is consistent with
Figures 2 and 3 plotting average unemployment rates against the average of the
logged stock of foreign nationals and the logged stock of foreign born immigrants,
respectively.
However, we are interested in the eects of immigration on unemployment.
Hence, we have to control for the reversed causality. In order to get rid of the
endogeneity problem due to reversed causality, we are pursuing two strategies.
First, we control for time-invariant and country-specic eects. This wipes out
all level eects between countries. Hence, this regressions only use the change in
unemployment levels and immigration inows to identify the coecients.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 plots the change of unemployment against the change of immigration
inows, which removes the unobserved time-invariant country-specic hetero-
geneity. Again, the gure suggests a negative relationship between immigration
and unemployment.
Our second approach to control for the endogeneity due to reversed causal-
ity is to instrument the migration ows. How should we instrument migration
ows? To nd an external valid instrument, we have to look for other determi-
nants of migration besides destination country unemployment. There are three
main approaches to explain international migration ows: i) The human capital
investment approach. The human capital investment approach explains interna-
tional migration from the labor-supply side based on income (or wage) dier-
entials and on policy impediments to migration (see Borjas (1994, 1999), and
Grogger and Hanson (2008)). If one disallows for idiosyncratic factors (e.g., fam-
ily considerations) that might inuence the migration decision of individuals,
these models based upon relative wage rates can only explain one-way bilateral
aggregate migration ows, not two-way ows. ii) The search-theoretic approach.
The search-theoretic approach adopts the search-and-matching framework from
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) to international migration
(see McCall and McCall (1987) and Berninghaus and Seifert-Vogt (1991)). While
this approach is theortically very appealing, it does not directly point to a readily
available instrument. iii) The gravity-approach. The third approach is based on
the gravity equation. The gravity equation has a long history in the literatures
on bilateral aggregate trade and migration ows. In fact, the earliest uses of
the gravity equation were to model migration ows, cf. Ravenstein (1885, 1889).
Since then, the gravity equation has been used extensively to model migration
ows, cf. Zipf (1946), Stewart (1948), Isard (1975), Sen and Smith (1995). The
gravity model was rst adopted for studying international trade ows in Tinber-
gen (1962) and Linnemann (1966), and is well established in the trade literature.
8As the gravity approach explains international migration ows very well, we
will stick to this last approach to generate an instrumental variable. Hence, we
will rst predict bilateral migration ows between countries using the gravity
approach and then use the predicted migration ows in the second stage when
explaining the unemployment rate.
Seperate from this \external" instrument, we will follow the established method-
ology used in Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer
(2011b) and rely on dynamic panel estimators which use \internal" instruments,
i.e. suitable lags of regressors in both dierences and levels, in order to control
for both unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity as well as endogeneity of the
migration variable. In addition, these estimators allow to control for the possible
endogeneity of other control variables like e.g. the openness measure capturing
trade linkages of the migration receiving country. We will describe the used
control variables in the following section.
3.2 Controls
We closely follow Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) in our choice of control
variables.
We follow Alcal a and Ciccone (2004) and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer
(2011b) and construct a real openness measure, labeled total trade openness. It
is dened as the sum of total imports and exports in exchange rate US-$ over
GDP in purchasing power parity US-$. We construct it by multiplying the current
price openness measure (total current price openness) times the GDP price level
from the Penn World Tables, edition 7.0.13
In addition, we construct openness measures for merchandise trade only us-
ing data from the OECD (2011c) International Trade by Commodity Statistics
database. Again, we calculate a real and current price openness measure (mer-
chandise openness and merchandise current price openness, respectively).
Wage distortion is the sum of the tax wedge and the average replacement
rate. The tax wedge is the average tax wedge on labor as a percentage of total
labor compensation and is computed for a couple with two children and averages
across dierent situations regarding the wage of the second earner. Tax wedge
data are from the OECD. Specically, we use the tax wedge data from Bassanini
and Duval (2009) until 2003 and the publicly available data for 2004 to 2007 from
the OECD (2011f) Taxing Wages database. Note that for the overlapping years,
data from both sources do not perfectly match for some countries. In general,
however, data are nearly or even exactly the same. We therefore merge the data
to ll up the variable for the whole sample period. The average replacement
rate data are from the Benets and Wages study from the OECD (2007). It is
dened as the average of the gross unemployment benet replacement rates for
13Felbermayr, Prat and, Schmerer (2011b) use the Penn World Tables, edition 6.2.
9two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment
and is comparable across countries. As data are available only for odd years, we
follow Bassanini and Duval (2009) and interpolate the data for even years. For a
detailed description of the OECD replacement rate measures, see Martin (1996).
EPL is an employment protection legislation index which is comparable across
countries and is from the Going for Growth database from the OECD (2010).
It measures protection for regular employment and is scaled from 0 to 6 from
weakest to strongest protection.
Union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are
trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners
and is from the OECD (2011e) Labour Force Statistics.
High corporatism is an index variable from the Database on Institutional
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social
Pacts which is compiled by the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Stud-
ies AIAS at the University of Amsterdam. It measures the degree of coordination
of wage bargaining in the respective country where 1 indicates rm-level wage
bargaining and 5 equals economy-wide bargaining. Note that Felbermayr, Prat,
and Schmerer (2011b) only use a dummy variable from Bassanini and Duval
(2009) to indicate high wage coordination. These data, however, are only avail-
able until 2003 and do not vary across our sample period and hence would be
dropped from the regression. We therefore use the index measure which contains
more information.
PMR is a measure of product market regulation on a scale from 0 to 6 indicat-
ing increasing regulatory restrictions to competition from Conway et al. (2006).
We again follow Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) and use the OECD data
on regulation in seven sectors|telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger
transport, and road freight|to measure overall product market regulation. As
manufacturing sectors are less regulated and open to foreign competition, and
most anti-competitive legislation is concentrated in the considered sectors, the
measures do reect an important part of the overall degree of product market
regulation in a country, see Conway et al. (2006). The measures are based on
regulation-related policies in the respective countries and are specically con-
structed to allow cross-country comparisons. Further details on these measures
can be found in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Note that the OECD also compiles
data on economy-wide measures of product market regulation. These, however,
are only collected irregularly, prohibiting their use in a panel study. The used
measure is highly correlated with the economy-wide measure for the years where
it is available.
Population is the population of the receiving country from the OECD (2011e)
Labour Force Statistics.
Output gap is the output gap in percent as reported in the OECD (2011a)
Economic Outlook 89 data.
In additional regressions, we include control variables from Dutt, Mitra, and
10Ranjan (2009). Civil liberties is an index computed by Freedom House which
gives the amount of civil liberties in a country. It runs from 1 to 7 where 1
indicates a maximum of liberties. Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) include a
dummy which is 1 in the years after a country has permanently liberalized trade.
In our sample, all countries have free trade according to this index, hence we
cannot include this dummy as it does not have variation. Therefore, we construct
the variable years since liberalization which measures the years since a country
has permanently liberalized its trade. It is based on data collected by Wacziarg
and Welch (2008).14
To generate the instrumental variable, the predicted bilateral migration ows
from a gravity-type migration regression, we use indicators for contiguity, com-
mon ocial language, and common colonial relationship after 1945 as well as the
weighted bilateral distance between economic centers of the receiving and send-
ing countries. All variables are from CEPII, see Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010).
Summary statistics for the gravity dataset can be found in Table 2.
4 Empirical specication
We follow the tradition of empirical labor market studies surveyed in Bassanini
and Duval (2009) and use panel methods.
Specically, we follow Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) and Felbermayr,
Prat and Schmerer (2011b). Hence, we estimate variants of the following dynamic
model
uit = ui;t 1 + NETINFLOWit + OPENNESSit
+CONTROLSit + i + t + "it: (1)
where uit is the unemployment rate in country i at time t, NETINFLOWit is
the net inow of immigrants into country i at time t, OPENNESSit is a standard
openness measure (the sum of imports and exports over GDP), CONTROLSit
is a vector of control variables, and i, t, "it are country and period eects and an
error term, respectively. In contrast to Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b)
we do not use ve-year averages for our regressions as we would lose a lot of
observations given the short time-series of the migration data. Additionally, we
also want to capture the short-term transitional eects of migration on unem-
ployment in our dynamic specications, which precludes us from taking averages
over years.
The standard estimator for dynamic panel models with unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity is the dierence GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano
14We assume the year 1945 for all countries where Wacziarg and Welch (2008) report \always"
instead of a specic year as the permanent liberalization year. In our sample, these countries
are Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
11and Bond (1991). However, this estimator suers from potentially huge small
sample bias when the number of time periods is small and the dependent vari-
able shows a high degree of persistence, see Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999).
As unemployment numbers are very persistent, we follow Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and also present estimates of the model
using system GMM which circumvents the nite sample bias if one is willing to
assume a mild stationarity assumption on the initial conditions of the underlying
data generating process.15 This estimator uses moment conditions for the model
both in dierences and in levels to reap signicant eciency gains. However,
eciency gains do not come without a cost: The number of instruments tends
to increase exponentially with the number of time periods. This proliferation
of instruments leads to an overtting of endogenous variables and increases the
likelihood of false positive results and suspiciously high pass rates of specica-
tions test like Hansen's J-test, a routinely used statistic to check the validity of
the dynamic panel model, see Roodman (2009a). We therefore follow his advice
and present results with a collapsed instrument matrix for both the dierence
and system GMM estimators.16 We also use the Windmeijer (2005) nite sample
correction for standard errors.
As described above, NETINFLOW it is likely to be endogenous. Hence, we
instrument this variable by suitable lags. In addition, we use predicted migrant
inows, a method inspired by Frankel and Romer (1999) who use predicted trade
ows as an instrument for trade ows.17 The predictions are obtained by specify-
ing a gravity equation, as discussed above. More precisely, bilateral international
migration INFLOWijt is specied as a function of geographic variables, GDPs








where Yit and Yjt are the GDPs of the origin and destination country, DISTij is a
(potentially multidimensional) time-invariant distance measure between country
i and j, and Pit and Pjt are the measures for origin and destination market
potential, or \multilateral resistance" terms.
Typically, Yit=Pit and Yjt=Pjt are replaced by originyear and destinationyear
xed eects (which also take account of Ywt) and one takes logs of Equation (2)
in order to get an empirical specication linear in the parameters, allowing to
estimate the parameters via ordinary least squares. However, as migration data
15Specically, the deviations from the long-run mean of the dependent variable have to be
uncorrelated with the stationary individual-specic long-run mean itself, see Blundell and Bond
(1998).
16All GMM estimations are carried out using the xtabond2 package in Stata, see Roodman
(2009b).
17See Felbermayr, Hiller and Sala (2010) who also use a Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument
for immigration to investigate the eect of immigration on per capita income.
12are likely to be heteroskedastic and contain zero migration ows, taking logs is no
longer feasible.18 Fortunately, there are a couple of recent contributions concern-
ing gravity equation estimation taking into account heteroskedasticity and zero
trade ows. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) proposed a sample selection
model to account for zero trade ows and showed that omitting zero trade ows
leads to biased estimates. They also quantify the sizable biases in one example.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008) suggest to estimate the gravity model
in multiplicative form employing a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood esti-
mator in order to account for the \log of gravity". The \log of gravity" says
that taking logs of the right and left hand side of the gravity equation may
lead to inconsistent and biased estimates because of Jensen's inequality, i.e.,
E(lnINFLOWijt) 6= lnE(INFLOWijt). This is for example the case in the
presence of heteroskedasticity, which is very likely the case with migration and
trade data.
In order to account for the heterogeneity and zeros in the bilateral migration
ow data, we follow the approach of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008). Our
empirical specication for the rst step gravity model of international bilateral
migration ows is therefore:
INFLOW ijt = exp(DIST ij + it + jt)"ijt; (3)
where it and jt are originyear and destinationyear xed eects, and "ijt is
a multiplicative remainder error term. Note that the xed eects also control
for origin and destination variables commonly used in Frankel and Romer (1999)
type regressions like the land area covered by the respective country as well as
its population.19
We specify DISTij to consist of bilateral geographical distance (GDIST ij)20,
a contiguity dummy between countries (CONTIGij), a dummy for a common of-
cial primary language (COMLANG OFFij), and a dummy indicating whether
the two countries had a colonial relationship after 1945 (COL45ij), i.e.
DIST ij = %1 ln(GDISTij) + %2CONTIGij + %3COMLANG OFFij
+%4COL45ij: (4)
As our migration data are bilateral but our second stage regression for explain-
ing the unemployment rate has only country-time but no bilateral variation, we
sum up our predictions of migration ows d INFLOW ijt over all origin countries,
18Some authors replace zero values by a unit value for the migration ow. In general, this
leads to inconsistent estimates.
19The gravity equation explains bilateral total ows of migrants. Hence, we use bilateral
total inows as dependent variable in specication (3).
20We use the simple weighted bilateral distance measure as proposed by Head and Mayer
(2000) which is provided by CEPII and which is dened as distance between regions within
countries weighted by the economic size of the regions.
13i.e., d INFLOW jt =
PN
i=1 d INFLOW ijt.21
5 Regression results
In this section, we present our results. In the rst subsection we present regression
results from our benchmark specication using dierent estimators. The second
subsection discusses several robustness checks concerning dierent measures of
migration, trade openness as well as using additional control variables.
[Table 3 about here.]
5.1 Benchmark results
Table 3 presents eight dierent specications which all use as dependent variable
the unemployment rate and some or all of the following explanatory variables:
the net inows of migrants into the country (in logs), a measure of total trade
openness, an index of wage distortion, a measure of employment protection leg-
islation, a measure of union density, an index of the centralization of the wage
bargaining process, a measure of product market regulation, a country's size as
measured by its population (in log), as well as a measure of the output gap to
control for business cycle eects. For the dynamic panel estimators, this list of
regressors is augmented by the lagged dependent variable.
Column (1) reproduces column (1) in Table 1 of Felbermayr, Prat, and
Schmerer (2011b) for our sample using a xed eects estimator (FE). Qualita-
tively, results are exactly the same as in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b).
However, in our case only population and the output gap are signicant.
Column (2) adds real total openness as dened in Alcal a and Ciccone (2004).
Contrary to Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) and Felbermayr, Prat and, Schmerer
(2011b), we nd a signicant positive eect of international trade on unemploy-
ment. This is in contrast with our Hypotheses 2 and 4. However, this does
not imply that our results are necessarily at odds with empirical ndings in
the literature. Both Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) and Felbermayr, Prat, and
Schmerer (2011b) use data for a dierent time period (1985{2004 and 1980{2003,
respectively) and also for a larger set of countries with vastly diering levels of
development. In addition we do not use ve-year averages of the data. Our
sample only focuses on a subset of OECD countries due to data availability of
the migration data as well as on a recent 10-year period, results may simply be
due to the specics of our sample under study. Also remember that we treat all
21Note that we even do not need to estimate the parameters of the migration equation
consistently to use d INFLOW jt as a valid instrument. The only assumption we need is that
d INFLOW jt is a constructed exogenous measure of migration stocks or ows. For a similar
argument, see Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b).
14variables as exogenous in specications (1) to (2), so our results could simply be
a result of the endogeneity of our regressors.
In column (3), we add the net inow of migrants to the specication given in
column (2), again using xed eects. It turns out that the sign of the coecient of
the immigration ow is negative. This is in line with Hypothesis 5 based on new
trade theory models with international migration but seems to be in contradiction
to Hypothesis 1 based on the labor demand model with wage rigidities. Hence,
immigration seems at least not to rise unemployment in the destination country.
However, our specication given in column (3) may suer from an endogeneity
bias. As stated in the introduction, migrants might select into countries with
lower unemployment rates.
Hence, in column (4) we take as instrument the predicted migration ows
based on the Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument described in Section 4. We
use an instrumental variables panel estimator with xed eects (FE-IV). Instru-
menting migration ows preserves the negative sign but still does not lead to a
precise estimate. The coecient implies that a 1 percent increase in migration
inows leads to a decrease in the unemployment rate of 0.006 percentage points.
Openness still has a signicant positive eect on unemployment. Specication (4)
still ignores both the persistence of unemployment rates as well as the potential
endogeneity of other control variables, like trade openness and wage distortion.
We therefore investigate the eect of migration on unemployment presenting dif-
ference and system GMM estimates in columns (5) to (8).
Column (5) presents the specication in column (2) augmented by the lagged
dependent variable where we treat openness, wage distortion, EPL, as well as the
high corporatism measure as endogenous variables using the Arrellano and Bond
(1991) dierence GMM estimator (Di-GMM). In this specication we do not
nd a signicant eect of the lagged unemployment rate. Additionally, it implies
a non-stationary behavior and openness is again not signicant.
Column (6) adds migration inows to the specication (5) which we also
treat as endogenous. It turns out to be non-signicant again but still negative.
However, one concern in this specication is the high coecient of the lagged
dependent variable. As soon as the dependent variable is highly persistent (our
estimates would even imply an explosive behavior of the unemployment rate), the
dierence GMM estimator has poor small sample properties, see Alonso-Borrego
and Arellano (1999). This is reected in the high standard errors of the estimates.
A suggestion for highly persistent dependent variables is the system GMM
estimator due to Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) which
exploits more information conveyed by additional moment conditions. Column
(7) repeats specication (5) estimated with system GMM (Sys-GMM). Here, the
output gap is signicantly negative. In addition, the lagged dependent variable
becomes highly signicant. It also implies a very high degree of persistence in
unemployment rates, as expected.
In column (8) we add migration ows to specication (7). Now, migration
15ows are again negative and also signicant on the 5% level. Openness still has a
positive impact on unemployment rates but not signicantly so. Additionally, the
coecient of the lagged dependent variable has the same magnitude as in previous
studies. This is our preferred specication, as it allows for the endogeneity of
various regressors and can handle the persistence of our dependent variable. It
implies that a one percent increase in migration inows leads to a 0.009 percentage
point decrease in the unemployment rate in the short-run. In the long-run, a one
percent increase of the total inow of migrants would amount to a 0.18 percentage
point decrease in the unemployment rate.22
Note that we report p-values of Hansen's overidentifying restrictions test as
well as tests on autocorrelation in the rst and second dierences of the residuals
for both the dierence and system GMM estimates. Even though one would
expect to detect autocorrelation in the rst dierences, this is not necessary to
apply the dynamic panel estimators. Autocorrelation in the second dierences
would be more problematic as it would render some instruments invalid. In any
case, it is well known that both the Hansen test as well as the autocorrelation tests
suer from potentially large losses in power for small sample sizes, see Roodman
(2009a). He explicitly states that for sample sizes as the ones used in our study,
reliance on asymptotic distributions of the test statistics is \worrisome". As there
exists ample evidence on the persistence of unemployment rates, we nevertheless
are condent that the system GMM estimator for the dynamic panel model is
appropriate.
To sum up, we nd a small but negative and signicant eect of migration
inows on unemployment rates. Hence, empirical evidence based on a cross-
section of aggregate migration ows does not support the widely held belief that
immigration is detrimental to employment prospects of workers in the destination
country on average.
5.2 Robustness checks
In this section we describe two tables with robustness checks. While Table 4
presents regressions using dierent migration measures than used in Table 3,
Table 5 gives results for dierent trade openness measures and additional control
variables.
5.2.1 Migration measures
In Table 3 we used net inows of migrants as migration measure where a migrant
was dened as a person which does not have the citizenship of the receiving
country. Column (1) in Table 4 reproduces our preferred specication (8) from
Table 3 for convenience of comparison. By subtracting return migrants from total
22The long-run eects are found by dividing the coecient by one minus the coecient on
the lagged dependent variable.
16immigrants, we assume that it is only the net number of migrants which inuences
the unemployment rate. From a theoretical point of view, it is not entirely
clear whether net or total migration ows should be used. If labor markets are
characterized by search frictions, total inows maybe the appropriate measure
especially for quantifying the short-run impact as every new migrant has to search
for a job. However, in the medium- to long-run or when labor markets are very
exible, net inows may be more appropriate.
[Table 4 about here.]
Hence, in column (2) we use instead of net inows of migrants the total inow
of migrants. Now, immigration ows are no longer signicant but still negative.
Interestingly, openness now has a negative but still non-signicant impact.
From the discussion of the theoretical background given in Section 2, it is
not clear whether we actually should use migration ows or stocks. Focusing on
comparative static results which compare two dierent static steady states with a
dierent distribution of labor across countries, we should actually use migration
stocks because net migration inows would be zero. From a dynamic perspective,
however, immigration ows matter for the short- and long-run unemployment
rates. Hence, we use migration ows so far.
However, as a robustness check we also investigate how the stock of migrants
eects the unemployment rate. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 we therefore
replace the migration ows by the stock of foreign citizens and the stock of foreign-
born persons, respectively. It turns out that the migration stocks have a positive
eect on the unemployment rate, but not signicantly so. However, in these
regressions the coecient on the lagged unemployment rate is larger than one and
highly signicant, implying an explosive behavior of the unemployment rate. In
addition the test statistic on autocorrelation in the second dierence of residuals
implies rejection of no autocorrelation in in column (3), hinting at a violation of
one of the system GMM assumptions. This may well be due to the limited data
availability for the stock data which reduces our sample considerably. Overall,
the regression with migration ows seem to better t our dynamic specication
as they do not imply a counter factual explosive behavior for the unemployment
rate.
Our employed dynamic GMM estimator does account for the endogeneity of
migration ows by relying on internal instruments based on suitable lags of the
respective variable. However, it is also possible to include external instruments,
such as our predicted migration ows. Specication (5) in Table 4 shows the
estimates from the specication given in column (1) augmented by the additional
exogenous variable. The results change as now net inows are no longer signicant
and have a positive impact on the unemployment rate.
175.2.2 Trade openness measures and additional controls
All regressions until now employed a real openness measure as proposed by Alcal a
and Ciccone (2004). It is dened as the sum of imports and exports in exchange
rate US-$ over GDP in purchasing power parity US-$. Traditionally, openness
measures are constructed by dividing by GDP in current US-$. In order to pro-
vide comparable results, we therefore use the latter openness measure in column
(1) in Table 5. Interestingly, we now can corroborate the ndings of Felbermayr,
Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) that openness reduces the unemployment rate. Note
though that these authors argue against using these openness measures and use
total trade openness instead as we do in our benchmark regressions. Still, immi-
gration remains to have a reducing eect on unemployment. Both variables are
signicant at the 5% level.
As services are very hard to measure and therefore not very well comparable
across countries, see e.g. Francois and Hoekman (2010), using total trade ows
including services may render openness a noisy measure for actual trade open-
ness. Therefore we re-run our preferred specication using an openness measure
based on merchandise trade only. In column (2) we present the Alcal a and Ci-
ccone (2004) real openness measure using only merchandise trade. While trade
openness again turns out to have a negative inuence on unemployment, it is no
longer signicant. Immigration has a negative impact on unemployment but is
not signicant. Immigration becomes negatively signicant again in column (3),
where we use the standard trade openness based on merchandise trade measured
in current US-$ GDP. Here, openness remains negative and not signicant.
In columns (4) to (6) in Table 5 we introduce additional control variables
following Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009). As openness measure, we return to the
total trade openness measure from our preferred specication. We add an index
of civil liberties and an additional measure of trade liberalization. Specically, we
add the years since permanent trade liberalization of the country as a control. To
allow for a non-linear impact of trade liberalization on unemployment we include
the variable both in levels and squared. The inclusion of the civil liberty index
renders net immigration non-signicant. So does the inclusion of the liberalization
variable. Both variables are not signicant, though. Openness again turns to
have a positive impact but is again not signicant. If we include both variables
simultaneously, the eect of immigration becomes positive again and we estimate
an autoregressive parameter which again implies an explosive behavior of the
unemployment rate.
In unreported regressions, we use a dierent output gap measure. The output
gap can also be calculated as the dierence between log GDP and log trend
GDP. We calculate GDP by multiplying real GDP per capita (chain) times the
population from the Penn World Tables, edition 7.0. The trend series is calculated
by Hodrick-Prescott ltering. We use 6.25 as the smoothing factor for annual data
18as recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).23 The main result to take away from
our robustness checks is that across a battery of dierent specications, we never
encounter a positive and signicant coecient on immigrant inows.
To again summarize our results, we nd a robust negative impact of immigra-
tion on the unemployment rate across a range of specications and using dierent
denitions of the control variables.
[Table 5 about here.]
6 Conclusions
How do international trade and immigration aect unemployment in the des-
tination country? While there is ample evidence that trade openness reduces
unemployment, to the best of our knowledge the literature has so far not investi-
gated the link between immigration and unemployment from a trade economist's
perspective. This is astonishing as it is well known since at least Mundell (1957)
that goods trade implies implicit factor movements. Hence, when one is inter-
ested in the eect of trade on unemployment it seems important to control for
additional movement of workers.
In this paper we present the rst evidence of the eects of trade and migration
inows on unemployment in the destination country from an international trade
perspective. In our sample, we nd a signicant negative aggregate eect of
immigration inows on unemployment rates in destination countries on average.
This nding seems to be at odds with the widely held belief of a detrimental
eect of immigration on unemployment amongst politicians and the public at
large. More importantly, our ndings leave us puzzled about how easy European
decision makers willingly accepted to erect barriers to the freedom of movement:
One of the corner stones of the European Common Market Policy is that work-
ers be employed on equal, non-discriminatory terms in all member states of the
European Union. Even though restrictions to this right could only be sustained
for a seven year transitional period if the country informed the European Com-
mission about serious disruptions on its labor market, two countries (Austria and
Germany) actually achieved shielding their labor markets from inows for the
full seven year period. Given our results, the feared detrimental eect of immi-
gration on domestic labor markets seems dubious at best, at least on average.
In the worst case it may have hindered welfare gains for the respective countries
due to more ecient allocation of labor across countries. Taking our results even
a step further, on average it may have even forced additional workers in Austria
and Germany into unemployment, contrary to the well-meant original intention.
23Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) use it for some regressions as well. However, they
use 400 as smoothing factor.
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Figure 3: Average unemployment and log of stock of immigrants (foreign born)
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Figure 4: Change in unemployment and change in log of net immigrant inows
30Table 1: Summary statistics for migration, trade and unemployment dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total unemployment rate 6.735 2.896 2.245 19.025 207
Migration data
Net immigrant inows (ln) 10.834 1.381 7.651 14.041 207
Total immigrant inows (ln) 11.308 1.292 8.598 14.041 207
Stock of immigrants (foreign nationals) (ln) 13.386 1.319 9.222 15.711 150
Stock of immigrants (foreign born) (ln) 14.041 1.541 11.365 17.441 111
Net inows (ln) (prediction) 11.566 1.269 8.949 14.044 207
Openness measures
Total trade openness 78.883 41.244 22.884 217.786 207
Total current price openness 80.491 38.867 18.188 184.308 207
Merchandise curr. price open. 31.218 17.046 8.236 91.566 207
Merchandise openness 30.325 16.847 8.535 106.512 207
Labor market data
Wage distortion (index) 57.170 18.418 25.187 92.17 207
EPL (index) 2.008 0.818 0.170 4.330 207
Union density (index) 32.755 20.362 7.617 81.285 207
High corporatism (index) 2.546 1.364 0 6 207
PMR (index) 2.348 0.728 0.900 4.700 207
Other control variables
Population (ln) 16.749 1.228 15.127 19.525 207
Output gap (%) 0.487 1.562 -2.901 4.752 207
Civil liberties (index) 1.159 0.367 1 2 207
years since perm. trade lib./1945 42.304 12.423 12 62 207
31Table 2: Summary statistics for gravity dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bilateral immigrant inows 1,286 6,316 0 218,822 41,545
Bilateral geographical distance (ln) 8.570 0.885 5.081 9.880 41,545
Contiguity 0.025 0.157 0 1 41,545
Common ocial language 0.120 0.325 0 1 41,545














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 4: Robustness checks: Dierent migration measures
Dependent variable: unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM
Lag dep. var. 0.951*** 0.948*** 1.039*** 1.013*** 0.927***
(0.082) (0.139) (0.108) (0.262) (0.127)
Net inow (ln) -0.888** 0.083
(0.390) (0.389)
Total inows (ln) -0.059
(0.654)
Total stock (nationality) (ln) 0.007
(0.008)
Total stock (c. of birth) (ln) 3.085
(1.956)
Total trade openness 0.003 -0.006 0.019** 0.051 0.020
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.041) (0.017)
Wage distortion (index) -0.011 0.059 0.074 0.067 -0.017
(0.029) (0.161) (0.111) (0.051) (0.048)
EPL (index) 0.948 3.361 1.520 -1.040 1.308
(0.641) (1.936) (1.232) (0.966) (0.752)
Union density (index) -0.003 0.027 0.001 -0.011 0.014
(0.021) (0.033) (0.066) (0.027) (0.039)
High corporatism (index) 0.345 0.315 -0.521 -1.069 -0.210
(0.473) (0.751) (1.238) (1.340) (0.446)
PMR (index) -0.250 -0.364 0.872 1.164 -0.141
(0.299) (0.371) (0.543) (0.855) (0.405)
Population (ln) 1.136** 0.442 0.389 -2.975 0.641
(0.443) (0.501) (1.524) (1.914) (0.726)
Output gap -0.205** -0.358*** -0.126 -0.869* -0.466**
(0.085) (0.128) (0.098) (0.481) (0.226)
Observations 207 207 155 111 207
Countries 24 24 21 18 24
Instruments 27 27 27 27 28
Hansen test (OID) 0.971 0.597 0.996 1.000 0.618
AR(1) 0.587 0.937 0.077 0.753
AR(2) 0.934 0.977 0.009 0.678 0.286
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all models control for unobserved country and period
eects. H0 for AR(1) and AR(2) is no autocorrelation. Openness, output gap, wage distortion, and net inow treated as
endogenous in GMM regressions. Maximum number of lags used is 1. Instrument matrix was collapsed as proposed by Roodman
(2009b). Constant estimated but not reported. Total stock (nationality) (ln) is multiplied by 10 for numerical stability.
34Table 5: Robustness checks: Dierent control variables
Dependent variable: unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM
Lag dep. var. 0.918*** 0.954*** 0.939*** 0.946*** 0.959*** 1.094**
(0.105) (0.081) (0.093) (0.159) (0.145) (0.547)
Net inow (ln) -0.388* -0.628 -0.429* -1.312 -0.722 0.537
(0.217) (0.384) (0.259) (0.805) (0.681) (7.046)




Merch. curr. price open. -0.013
(0.019)
Total trade openness 0.004 0.009 -0.008
(0.018) (0.019) (0.025)
Wage distortion (index) 0.022 0.016 0.015 0.026 -0.020 -0.013
(0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.068) (0.077) (0.239)
EPL (index) 0.249 1.306 0.784 0.105 0.900 3.787
(0.878) (1.243) (0.858) (1.610) (1.620) (15.165)
Union density (index) -0.007 -0.010 -0.005 -0.027 0.015 0.017
(0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.056) (0.189)
High corporatism (index) -0.330 -0.192 -0.295 0.270 0.194 -1.415
(0.226) (0.391) (0.476) (1.118) (0.707) (5.686)
PMR (index) 0.248 -0.267 0.096 -0.248 0.017 -0.130
(0.384) (0.771) (0.694) (0.508) (0.618) (0.779)
Population (ln) 0.305 0.547 0.424 1.475** 1.275* -0.651
(0.365) (0.504) (0.636) (0.633) (0.758) (6.850)
Output gap -0.275*** -0.276** -0.242 -0.222 -0.235*** -0.992
(0.095) (0.119) (0.169) (0.188) (0.088) (2.951)
Civil liberties -1.420 -0.251
(1.188) (2.803)
yrs. since lib. -0.090 0.127
(0.172) (0.800)
(yrs. since lib.)2 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.007)
Observations 207 207 207 207 207 207
Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
Instruments 27 27 27 28 29 30
Hansen test (OID) 0.919 0.930 0.944 0.929 0.986 0.970
AR(1) 0.456 0.818 0.576 0.716 0.773 0.814
AR(2) 0.182 0.246 0.154 0.553 0.853 0.818
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all models control for unobserved country and period eects.
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2) is no autocorrelation. Openness, output gap, wage distortion, and net inow treated as endogenous in GMM
regressions. Maximum number of lags used is 1. Instrument matrix was collapsed as proposed by Roodman (2009b). Constant estimated
but not reported.   
  Ifo Working Papers 
 
No. 114  Hornung, E., Immigration and the Diffusion of Technology: The Huguenot Diaspora 
in Prussia, November 2011. 
 
No. 113  Riener, G. and S. Wiederhold, Costs of Control in Groups, November 2011. 
 
No. 112  Schlotter, M., Age at Preschool Entrance and Noncognitive Skills before School – An 
Instrumental Variable Approach, November 2011. 
 
No. 111  Grimme, C., S. Henzel and E. Wieland, Inflation Uncertainty Revisited: Do Different 
Measures Disagree?, October 2011. 
 
No. 110  Friedrich, S., Policy Persistence and Rent Extraction, October 2011. 
 
No. 109  Kipar, S., The Effect of Restrictive Bank Lending on Innovation: Evidence from a 
Financial Crisis, August 2011. 
 
No. 108  Felbermayr, G.J., M. Larch and W. Lechthaler, Endogenous Labor Market Institutions in 
an Open Economy, August 2011. 
 
No.  107  Piopiunik, M., Intergenerational Transmission of Education and Mediating Channels: 
Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Reforms in Germany, August 2011. 
 
No. 106  Schlotter, M., The Effect of Preschool Attendance on Secondary School Track Choice in 
Germany, July 2011. 
 
No. 105  Sinn, H.-W. und T. Wollmershäuser, Target-Kredite, Leistungsbilanzsalden und Kapital-
verkehr: Der Rettungsschirm der EZB, Juni 2011. 
 
No. 104  Czernich, N., Broadband Internet and Political Participation: Evidence for Germany, 
June 2011. 
 
No. 103  Aichele, R. and G. Felbermayr, Kyoto and the Carbon Footprint of Nations, June 2011. 
 
No. 102  Aichele, R. and G. Felbermayr, What a Difference Kyoto Made: Evidence from Instrumen-
tal Variables Estimation, June 2011.    
 
No. 101  Arent, S. and W. Nagl, Unemployment Benefit and Wages: The Impact of the Labor 
Market Reform in Germany on (Reservation) Wages, June 2011. 
 
No. 100  Arent, S. and W. Nagl, The Price of Security: On the Causality and Impact of Lay-off 
Risks on Wages, May 2011. 
 
No. 99  Rave, T. and F. Goetzke, Climate-friendly Technologies in the Mobile Air-conditioning 
Sector: A Patent Citation Analysis, April 2011. 
 
No. 98  Jeßberger, C., Multilateral Environmental Agreements up to 2050: Are They Sustainable 
Enough?, February 2011. 
 
No. 97  Rave, T., F. Goetzke and M. Larch, The Determinants of Environmental Innovations and 
Patenting: Germany Reconsidered, February 2011. 
 
No.  96  Seiler, C. and K. Wohlrabe, Ranking Economists and Economic Institutions Using 
RePEc: Some Remarks, January 2011. 
 
No. 95  Itkonen, J.V.A., Internal Validity of Estimating the Carbon Kuznets Curve by Controlling for 
Energy Use, December 2010. 
 
No.  94  Jeßberger, C., M. Sindram and M. Zimmer, Global Warming Induced Water-Cycle 
Changes and Industrial Production – A Scenario Analysis for the Upper Danube River 
Basin, November 2010. 
 
No. 93  Seiler, C., Dynamic Modelling of Nonresponse in Business Surveys, November 2010. 
 
No. 92  Hener, T., Do Couples Bargain over Fertility? Evidence Based on Child Preference 
Data, September 2010. 
 
No. 91  Schlotter, M. und L. Wößmann, Frühkindliche Bildung und spätere kognitive und nicht-
kognitive Fähigkeiten: Deutsche und internationale Evidenz, August 2010. 
 
No. 90  Geis, W., High Unemployment in Germany: Why do Foreigners Suffer Most?, August 2010. 
 
No. 89  Strobel, T., The Economic Impact of Capital-Skill Complementarities in German and 
US Industries – Productivity Growth and the New Economy, July 2010. 
 